A model of measuring partisan seat safety for the discussion of legislative dominance under divided government

Youngjae Jin

Global Economic Review, 1998, vol. 27, issue 2, 77-94

Abstract: The study of divided government is one of important fields in public choice theory. American voters split their ballots as if intent on preserving divided party control. The U.S. House of Representatives has consistently been Democratic for much of the twentieth century. As indicated by Sprague, it is theoretically true that a number of significant consequences for partisan control of a legislature are entailed by the unequal distribution of seat safety under conditions of high levels of institutionalization. The problem is how to measure the institutionalization of partisan seat safety in a time-series. The model proposed by Sprague is somewhat awkward and complicated in measuring it. This paper provides a more plausible model and tests empirical data.

Date: 1998
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/12265089808449733 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:glecrv:v:27:y:1998:i:2:p:77-94

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RGER20

DOI: 10.1080/12265089808449733

Access Statistics for this article

Global Economic Review is currently edited by Kap-Young Jeong and Taeyoon Sung

More articles in Global Economic Review from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().