The Institutional Arrangements of Innovation: Antecedents and Performance Effects of Trust in High-Tech Alliances

Gjalt De Jong and Rosalinde Klein Woolthuis

Industry and Innovation, 2008, vol. 15, issue 1, 45-67

Abstract: In this study we investigate the institutional arrangements of innovation processes in high-tech alliances, focusing on the role of trust. A major strength of the research is the opportunity to address antecedents as well as performance effects of trust. The antecedents of interorganizational trust include a shared past, detailed interfirm contracts, relational openness and mutual dependence. We control for the size and cooperative culture of the focal firm and the knowledge value of the partner firm. Data from a field study of 391 Dutch firms in high-tech industries generally support the research model. The results provide convincing evidence to support the value of interorganizational trust in durable business relationships that strive for the development of new technological knowledge.

Keywords: Interorganizational trust; high-tech cooperation; alliance performance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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DOI: 10.1080/13662710701858520

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