Germany and France at cross purposes: the case of Banking Union

Joachim Schild

Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 2018, vol. 21, issue 2, 102-117

Abstract: In the past, France and Germany were able to exercise leadership in history-making decisions in monetary cooperation, from the establishment of the EMS to EMU. In the case of Banking Union (BU), however, Germany and France turned out to be the main opponents with little common influence. Why could we not observe the familiar pattern of Franco-German co-leadership in building the BU? My explanation points to diverging views on the social purpose of a BU, the asymmetrical distribution of its costs and benefits for the two countries, highly prominent distributional conflicts and severe domestic constraints in Germany. These explanatory factors also account for the unfinished character of Banking Union.

Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1080/17487870.2017.1396900

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