The multiple accountabilities of the European Banking Authority

John-Paul Salter

Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 2019, vol. 22, issue 3, 257-272

Abstract: The paper investigates the features, and relative strengths of the various accountability structures which exist around the European Banking Authority (EBA), studying how its hybrid nature makes for a set of complex and overlapping relationships. Drawing on interviews with EBA staff and industry practitioners, the paper exposes the tensions between these various channels of accountability, and comments on how they undermine the agency’s efficacy. It concludes with some suggestions for reforms to this arrangement, with the aim of improving the agency’s ability to operate.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1080/17487870.2017.1400436

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