Strategic trade policy and union-firm bargaining agenda

Luciano Fanti and Domenico Buccella

The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, 2016, vol. 25, issue 6, 787-808

Abstract: In this paper, we revisit the issue of the scope of bargaining between duopolistic firms and unions in an open economy with strategic trade policy. It is shown that, in contrast with the case of the absence of export tax/subsidy, a right-to-manage (RTM) arrangement always emerges endogenously as a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in agreement between parties. Moreover, such an arrangement may be also Pareto-optimal in both exporting countries in the sense that profits, workers' welfare (provided that union's power is sufficiently high) and social welfare as a whole are higher than the efficient bargaining (EB) arrangement. Moreover, since the government of the country in which there is EB (while in the other country the alternative agenda RTM is used) levies a tax on export, then the conventional result that under quantity competition it is always optimal for exporting countries to subsidise exports may be reversed.

Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:jitecd:v:25:y:2016:i:6:p:787-808

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DOI: 10.1080/09638199.2015.1130078

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