Addressing fairness concerns in shipping market: a bilateral contract mechanism

Jie Jin, Lingpeng Meng, Xudong Wang and Junliang He

Maritime Policy & Management, 2026, vol. 53, issue 5, 865-910

Abstract: The stability of shipping markets relies on sustainable relationships between shipping companies and freight forwarders. However, irrational behaviors driven by fairness concerns threaten this dynamic. To address contractual deficiencies in mitigating such behaviors, a bilateral contract mechanism characterized by ‘agency commission + channel profit sharing’ is proposed and evaluated in this paper. Key findings reveal that: (1) The contract effectively suppresses harmful distribution fairness concerns; (2) It is conducive to the continued existence of peer-induced fairness concern behaviour. This research advances the understanding of fairness-driven behaviours in shipping market and provides actionable guidance for designing mutually beneficial contracts.

Date: 2026
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03088839.2025.2538150 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:marpmg:v:53:y:2026:i:5:p:865-910

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/TMPM20

DOI: 10.1080/03088839.2025.2538150

Access Statistics for this article

Maritime Policy & Management is currently edited by Dr Kevin Li and Heather Leggate McLaughlin

More articles in Maritime Policy & Management from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().