EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

What's wrong with New Zealand's public benefit test?

Ivo Bertram ()

New Zealand Economic Papers, 2004, vol. 38, issue 2, 265-277

Abstract: New Zealand courts and regulatory authorities have since 1994 adopted an extreme neoliberal version of the public benefit test, treating wealth transfers from consumers to monopolists as welfare-neutral. This abandonment of the long-established consumer-welfare or balancing-weights standards used in most other OECD jurisdictions rests upon a misconstruction of the alleged inability of economists to reach consensus on how to evaluate changes in income distribution. The intellectual cul-de-sac occupied by “new welfare economics” should leave policymakers free to attack monopoly profits without having to endure utilitarian criticisms from neoliberal economists. In doing so. New Zealand policymakers would be acting in accordance with strong economic arguments for restraining monopoly, drawn from the wider mainstream of the economic literature and requiring no utilitarian underpinning.

Date: 2004
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00779950409544406 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:nzecpp:v:38:y:2004:i:2:p:265-277

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RNZP20

DOI: 10.1080/00779950409544406

Access Statistics for this article

New Zealand Economic Papers is currently edited by Dennis Wesselbaum

More articles in New Zealand Economic Papers from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2025-04-09
Handle: RePEc:taf:nzecpp:v:38:y:2004:i:2:p:265-277