 Monitoring female directors and earnings management, does corporate governance matter?Mohammed A. Alhossini, Alaa Mansour Zalata, Sameeh Elmahdy Samaha and Mohamed Hessian Cogent Business & Management, 2024, vol. 11, issue 1, 2396538 Abstract: In contrast to prior research on female directors’ participation, this study focuses on female directors playing a monitoring role within boardrooms. In addition, the current study investigates whether these female directors freeride from other strong governance mechanisms in place. Based on a sample of US firms, we document that female directors fulfilling monitoring responsibilities play a crucial role in protecting shareholders’ interests in both weak and strong corporate governance settings. In addition, interestingly, our results suggest that female directors, particularly monitoring female directors, significantly mitigate earnings management in firms audited by Big-4 and non-Big-4 auditors although their impact seems to be more prominent within non-Big-4 audit firms. That is, it seems that these directors are more likely to scrutinize managers closely when they feel that shareholders are at risk of being subjected to deception due to opportunistic practices by managers (i.e. when managers deliberately choose relatively low-quality auditors to audit corporate financial reports). Date: 2024 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:oabmxx:v:11:y:2024:i:1:p:2396538 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1080/23311975.2024.2396538 Access Statistics for this article Cogent Business & Management is currently edited by Len Tiu Wright and Tahir Nisar More articles in Cogent Business & Management from Taylor & Francis Journals |
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