Risk management committee, independent commissioner, and audit fee: An update

Nadia Klarita Rahayu, Iman Harymawan, Wulandari Fitri Ekasari, John Nowland and David McMillan

Cogent Economics & Finance, 2021, vol. 9, issue 1, 1892926

Abstract: We investigate whether the risk management committee and independent commissioner contribute to the audit fee. We use 720 observations from Indonesian listed companies for 2015–2018. We use ordinary least square analysis to address our hypotheses. The result shows that the proportion of independent commissioners weakens the relationship between RMC and audit fees. Our study proved that the existence of a risk management committee would lead to a higher demand for audit coverage. As a result, the audit fee increased. RMC may demand high-quality external assurance, but it may be ignored because the independent commissioner has more authority than RMC. In addition, we also used coarsened exact matching with a consistent result as the OLS. These findings provide evidence for policymakers on the relationship between audit fees and risk management committees.

Date: 2021
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/23322039.2021.1892926 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:oaefxx:v:9:y:2021:i:1:p:1892926

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/OAEF20

DOI: 10.1080/23322039.2021.1892926

Access Statistics for this article

Cogent Economics & Finance is currently edited by Steve Cook, Caroline Elliott, David McMillan, Duncan Watson and Xibin Zhang

More articles in Cogent Economics & Finance from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().