Amending budget bills in the Russian State Duma

Ben Noble

Post-Communist Economies, 2017, vol. 29, issue 4, 505-522

Abstract: Do budget bills change during review in the Russian State Duma? If so, by how much and why? Portrayals of the contemporary Federal Assembly as a ‘rubber stamp’ parliament would suggest that budget initiatives undergo no amendment during the formal period of legislative review. There is, however, evidence of bill change. The article’s primary goal is to present this surprising evidence, focusing on changes to spending figures in the 2002–2016 budget bills. The article also discusses why such changes are made, assessing hypotheses concerning legislator influence, technical updating and intra-executive conflict.

Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1080/14631377.2017.1333791

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