Cartel stability under antitrust enforcement and product differentiation

Williams Huamani and Marcelo José Braga

European Competition Journal, 2025, vol. 21, issue 2, 358-370

Abstract: This paper investigates cartel stability under antitrust enforcement and product differentiation – pricing cartel. We do not observe a clear relationship between the degree of product differentiation and cartel stability. However, antitrust enforcement makes a more significant impact on cartel stability when products are highly differentiated. In other words, under antitrust enforcement, firms have greater incentives to collude when products are close substitutes.

Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/17441056.2024.2440219 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:recjxx:v:21:y:2025:i:2:p:358-370

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/recj20

DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2024.2440219

Access Statistics for this article

European Competition Journal is currently edited by Philip Marsden

More articles in European Competition Journal from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().