Effective remedies in digital market abuse of dominance cases

Anush Ganesh

European Competition Journal, 2025, vol. 21, issue 2, 371-420

Abstract: The paper examines effective remedies for abuse of dominance in digital markets by analyzing tools including Regulation 1/2003 and the Digital Markets Act (DMA) 2022. It evaluates both radical remedies proposed by commentators and DMA obligations, applying them to seven digital market abuse cases. While primarily focusing on Article 102 TFEU as the main remedy mechanism, the paper also considers DMA's role in addressing these infringements.The study covers both pricing and non-pricing infringements from past Article 102 TFEU cases. Drawing from existing literature, it assesses potential remedies, their benefits, and implementation costs. The paper specifically examines Articles 5 and 6 of the DMA to determine the most effective remedies for the seven identified infringements.A key finding is that digital market cases require individualized assessment for implementing effective remedies, rather than a one-size-fits-all approach.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1080/17441056.2024.2440222

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