Cartels as ‘fraud’? Insights from collusion in southern and East Africa in the fertiliser and cement industries

Thando Vilakazi and Simon Roberts

Review of African Political Economy, 2019, vol. 46, issue 161, 369-386

Abstract: Anti-competitive conduct involves firms misrepresenting their behaviour and manipulating markets. In sector case studies of cement and fertiliser, the authors find that collusion in southern and East Africa operated through industry associations exchanging information, secret agreements and lobbying government to distort notionally developmental policies for private benefit. This has occurred in the context of liberalisation and deregulation. Transnational corporations have leveraged control of infrastructure and inputs, and favourable regulations to sustain market power, while presenting themselves as ‘development partners’. Competition law is portrayed as the ‘governance fix’ for these issues but this ignores political economy issues which underpin many collusive arrangements.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1080/03056244.2018.1536974

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Review of African Political Economy is currently edited by Graham Harrison, Branwen Gruffydd Jones, Claire Mercer, Nicolas Pons-Vignon, Aurelia Segatti and Ray Bush

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