E-government, anticorruption, and citizens’ use of personal connections: evidence from Chinese municipalities

Ziteng Fan and Liang Ma

Journal of Chinese Governance, 2024, vol. 9, issue 3, 372-395

Abstract: Why do citizens prefer to utilize personal connections (e.g. guanxi) with government officials to access public services? Conventional wisdom suggests that improvements in formal institutions can reduce the popularity of informal behaviors; however, limited research has explored the relevant roles of e-government and anticorruption endeavors. Thus, based on survey data from 30 Chinese municipalities and multilevel regression designs, this study shows that citizens in cities with higher e-government development levels or who perceive governments’ anticorruption efforts to be effective are less likely to perform guanxi practices. The negative effect of e-government is also more salient among individuals with political connections. Therefore, this study contributes to the ongoing discussion on the relationship between formal institutions and guanxi practices by revealing the specific ways in which e-government development and anticorruption efforts lessen individuals’ reliance on guanxi.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1080/23812346.2024.2352912

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