Electoral turnovers and the disappointment of enduring presidential power: constitution making in Zambia

Marja Hinfelaar, O’Brien Kaaba and Michael Wahman

Journal of Eastern African Studies, 2021, vol. 15, issue 1, 63-84

Abstract: Much has been written about the strength of African presidentialism. This article studies the resilience of presidential power in Zambia in the face of electoral turnover. Opposition election campaigns, conducted by both the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) and the Patriotic Front (PF), featured deep constitutional reform as prominent campaign pledges. Nevertheless, after winning the presidency, both parties failed to reduce presidential power. We support this conclusion by an analysis of constitution making in Zambia since the early 1990s and an analysis of the latest 2016 amended constitution. We argue that presidential powers become valuable institutional assets for newly elected elites attempting to reduce electoral uncertainty and consolidate power. Consequently, reduction in presidential power is unlikely as long as the executive is able to control the constitution making process.

Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1080/17531055.2020.1851515

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