Explaining institutional change in global financial regulation

Simon Linder and Thomas Rixen

Review of International Political Economy, 2025, vol. 32, issue 5, 1492-1518

Abstract: What explains institutional change in global financial regulation? We propose a model in which institutional change in response to exogenous shocks such as financial crises and legitimacy concerns is moderated by an endogenous variable, institutionalisation. We test our model using a mixed methods design. Relying on a newly constructed quantitative indicator of institutionalisation, we analyse 16 global regulatory institutions from 1967 to 2017. We examine causal mechanisms in three case studies using a new distinction between informal, contract- and treaty-based institutions. Our results support the model. Lowly institutionalised and informal institutions, like the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, experienced significant institutional change and formalisation, becoming contract-based institutions. Contract-based institutions with intermediate institutionalisation, such as the International Accounting Standards Board, underwent change but remained in their category. Treaty-based institutions with high institutionalisation, like the International Monetary Fund, largely resisted change. These findings address gaps and complement the literature on global finance by providing a systematic large-N analysis with a focus on institutional development. We also contribute to historical institutionalism by highlighting the interaction of exogenous and endogenous factors, and to the literature on institutional choice between formal and informal IOs.

Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/09692290.2025.2489080 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:rripxx:v:32:y:2025:i:5:p:1492-1518

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/rrip20

DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2025.2489080

Access Statistics for this article

Review of International Political Economy is currently edited by Gregory Chin, Juliet Johnson, Daniel Mügge, Kevin Gallagher, Ilene Grabel and Cornelia Woll

More articles in Review of International Political Economy from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().