Delegation in Customs Union under Taste Diversity

Sunandan Ghosh

The International Trade Journal, 2022, vol. 36, issue 2, 123-146

Abstract: This article investigates how diversity in consumer tastes among potential customs union (CU) members influences delegation decisions between them in the context of CU formation. The model used involves a monopolist, situated in a nonmember country, which chooses the quality of a vertically differentiated good to supply to two potential CU members. Formation of a CU can be sustained only if the monopolist chooses to serve consumers with both low and high maximum willingness to pay in the potential CU members. Delegation decision in setting common external tariff depends on the degree of taste diversity and size of population in each member.

Date: 2022
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/08853908.2021.1885529 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:uitjxx:v:36:y:2022:i:2:p:123-146

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/uitj20

DOI: 10.1080/08853908.2021.1885529

Access Statistics for this article

The International Trade Journal is currently edited by George R. G. Clarke

More articles in The International Trade Journal from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().