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The Influence of Large Stake Family Control on Performance: Is It Agency or Entrenchment?

Sharon L. Oswald, Lori A. Muse and Matthew W. Rutherford

Journal of Small Business Management, 2009, vol. 47, issue 1, 116-135

Abstract: Agency theory posits that the greater degree of control by those with decision‐making authority, the greater the overall organizational performance. Conversely, entrenchment theory implies that at extremely high levels of inside control by those with decision authority, organizational performance decreases. Using a nationwide sample of 2,631 privately held and publically traded family businesses, we examined if the relationship of percent family ownership is an agency or entrenchment relationship and found the latter. Specifically, there was a statistically significant negative relationship between percent of family control and sales growth as well as a strong inverse relationship between percent of family controlling the top management team and all measures of financial performance.

Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-627X.2008.00264.x

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