Board Monitoring in a Privately Held Firm: When Does CEO Duality Matter? The Moderating Effect of Ownership

Robin Deman, Ann Jorissen and Eddy Laveren

Journal of Small Business Management, 2018, vol. 56, issue 2, 229-250

Abstract: Drawing from agency theory and the attention‐based view of the firm, this study extends the understanding of the conditions under which CEO duality is negatively associated with board monitoring in a privately held firm context. Measuring monitoring in terms of board members’ involvement in behavioral control, output control, and strategy control tasks (Huse 2005), results show that CEO duality is significantly and negatively related only to the behavioral control task. In addition, we show that this negative effect is contingent on whether ownership is concentrated in the hands of a controlling shareholder as well as the type of controlling shareholder.

Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1111/jsbm.12251

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