Strategic R&D Investment Under Information Revelation

Flavia Cortelezzi and Giovanni Villani

The Engineering Economist, 2012, vol. 57, issue 1, 20-40

Abstract: R&D projects generally involve multiple phases with or without overlapping. Moreover, the investment is usually made in a phased manner, with the commencement of the subsequent phase being dependent on the successful completion of the preceding phase. The aim of this article is to analyze the equilibrium strategies of two firms competing for a two-stage sequential R&D investment, when a firm may infer a private signal from the strategy played by the other. Thus, firms must formulate their optimal strategies in a context of imperfect information. We evaluate the resulting compound option with information revelation as an American compound exchange option using Monte Carlo simulations. We then show that different equilibria may arise.

Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1080/0013791X.2011.649511

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