On the design of fundraising campaigns: Goal setting and information provision in dynamic fundraisers

Adrienne W. Sudbury (), Christian Vossler and Daniel Rondeau ()
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Adrienne W. Sudbury: College of Business and Economics, Longwood University, VA 23909, http://www.longwood.edu/directory/profile/sudburyawlongwoodedu/
Daniel Rondeau: University of Victoria, https://web.uvic.ca/~rondeau/

No 2025-04, Working Papers from University of Tennessee, Department of Economics

Abstract: This study uses a laboratory experiment to study key aspects of dynamic fundraising campaigns that utilize goals that must be met for a good or service to be provided. We compare campaigns characterized by a final goal only, an intermediate goal and a known final goal, and a third setting where the final goal is unknown at the beginning of the campaign. The design further varies whether an individual’s payoff from reaching a goal is uncertain or certain, which is intended to capture the effects of providing vague or precise information on the good or service to be provided. We find that adding an intermediate goal decreases both the likelihood of reaching the final goal and the amount of money raised. Even for successful campaigns, introducing an intermediate goal slows the timing of contributions and alters contribution strategies. For the one-goal case, value uncertainty decreases the likelihood the goal is reached.

Keywords: fundraising; choice architecture; provision points; goal setting; stretch goals; uncertainty; lab experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D80 H41 H42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 67 pages
Date: 2025-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-nud
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