Promises and Partner-Switch

Giovanni Di Bartolomeo (), Martin Dufwenberg and Stefano Papa

No 165, CIMEO Working Paper Series from Centre for Investigation and Modelling of Experimental Observations (CIMEO)

Abstract: Building on a partner-switching mechanism, this study experimentally tests two theories explaining why promises foster trust and cooperation. The expectation-based explanation operates through belief-dependent guilt aversion, while the commitment-based explanation suggests that promises create commitment power through a belief-independent preference to keep one's word. The paper applies the partner-switching mechanism to a trust-game setting with unilateral promises and compares its findings with previous evidence based on informal agreements. The results support the expectation-based explanation over the commitment-based explanation, suggesting that one-sided promises and informal agreements may activate different behavioral mechanisms.

Keywords: promises; partner-switching; expectations; commitment; guilt; informal agreements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C91 D01 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-01
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Related works:
Journal Article: Promises and partner-switch (2023)
Working Paper: Promises and Partner-Switch (2021)
Working Paper: Promises and Partner-Switch (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ter:wpaper:00165

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