Inequity Aversion in Dictator Games

Pierpaolo Battigalli, Giovanni Di Bartolomeo () and Stefano Papa

No 193, CIMEO Working Paper Series from Centre for Investigation and Modelling of Experimental Observations (CIMEO)

Abstract: We examine the role of inequity aversion in decision-making, particularly as it relates to the opportunity cost of reducing inequality. Focusing on a simple dictator game, our results suggest that the link between such opportunity cost and sharing rates is more complex than it appears at first glance.

Keywords: social preferences; inequality aversion; opportunity costs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C91 D01 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ter:wpaper:00193

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