Nudging Tax Compliance: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment

Giovanni Di Bartolomeo (), Silvia Fedeli and Stefano Papa

No 205, CIMEO Working Paper Series from Centre for Investigation and Modelling of Experimental Observations (CIMEO)

Abstract: We test whether minimal, non-informative messages can nudge tax compliance beyond standard deterrence. In a within-subjects lab experiment, we randomize exposure to either a reminder that leaves audit probability unchanged or an informative warning tied to higher audit probability, and estimate effects on both the probability of evasion and the share of income evaded. A short non-informative reminder, holding incentives fixed, lowers the probability of evasion by about 16 percentage points, with no detectable effect on the evaded share among evaders; informative messages add at most marginal effects once audit probability is controlled for.

Keywords: tax compliance; nudge; deterrence; audit; laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D91 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-nud
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ter:wpaper:00205

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