Cost of Enforcement in Developing Countries with Credit Market Imperfection

Munetomo Ando and Noriyuki Yanagawa
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Noriyuki Yanagawa: Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo

No CIRJE-F-276, CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

Abstract: This paper examines development processes of a country when the degree of verifiability is endogenously determined. We characterize the development processes rigorously and show that although the efforts for improving of verifiability are important, the income distribution of a country is crucial for the effectiveness of efforts to the development processes. Moreover, this paper explains the situation where one country shows high growth rates temporally even if the technology of enforcement is poor, but eventually it experiences economic collapses.

Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2004-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2004/2004cf276.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Cost of Enforcement in Developing Countries with Credit Market Imperfection (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tky:fseres:2004cf276

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