Does Equalization Transfer Enhance Partial Tax Cooperation?

Wenming Wang, Keisuke Kawachi and Hikaru Ogawa
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Wenming Wang: Business School, Hunan University
Keisuke Kawachi: Faculty of Humanities, Law and Economics, Mie University
Hikaru Ogawa: Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo

No CIRJE-F-1035, CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

Abstract: This paper analyzes the effect of equalization transfer scheme on partial tax cooperation condition in a repeated game setting. It is shown that in order to achieve partial tax cooperation between two capital-rich (exporting) countries, the full equalization transfer scheme is superior to the partial equalization transfer scheme, whereas in order to achieve partial tax cooperation between two capital-poor (importing) countries, the partial equalization transfer scheme is superior to the full equalization transfer scheme.

Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2016-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-sea
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tky:fseres:2016cf1035

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