Granting Taxing Rights for a Pareto Improvement

Hikaru Ogawa and Ryota Tsuchiya
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Ryota Tsuchiya: Graduate School of Economcis, The University of Tokyo

No CIRJE-F-1235, CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

Abstract: This study examines the effect of international taxation rules that allow market countries to tax the sales of a multinational firm represented by global tech giant. It develops an asymmetric tax competition model where one country hosts a multinational firm selling digital services over the internet worldwide. The main finding is that changes in tax rules to grant taxing rights to market countries do not lead to con icts of interest between countries, but rather to Pareto improvements: it benefits not only the market

Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2024-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ipr, nep-pay and nep-pbe
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tky:fseres:2024cf1235

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