Protection against National Emergency: International Public Goods and Insurance

Toshihiro Ihori

No 97-F-38, CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

Abstract: This paper develops a model of economic protection against random emergency costs. To mitigate the effects of these disruptions, each country creates a private mutual insurance market and provides voluntarily an international public good. We will explore how protection through voluntary provision of an international public good as well as mutual insurance would affect welfare. The existence of both mutual insurance and an international public good is crucial to obtain welfare equalization and the weak paradox of international transfer.

Pages: 23 pages
Date: 1997-11
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/97/f38/contents.htm (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tky:fseres:97f38

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CIRJE administrative office ().