Institutional Trusteeship and Competition Policy in the Age of Sustainability: Designing Markets for Public Value and Responsible Power

Hitoshi Matsushima
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Hitoshi Matsushima: Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo

No CIRJE-J-313, CIRJE J-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

Abstract: Private institutional design by tech giants such as GAFA and the exclusion of non-price values, exemplified by the suppression of ESG-related disclosures, have revealed structural challenges that existing competition laws can no longer adequately address. This paper proposes a new design philosophy called institutional trusteeship, which embeds legitimacy into the internal architecture of institutions as a response to this institutional void. Institutional trusteeship is built upon four foundational pillars: public purpose, co-governance, accountability and transparency, and adaptability. It functions as a complementary framework to legal systems. The paper reinterprets the Japan Fair Trade Commission’s cease and desist order against Google from the perspective of institutional trusteeship, and explores its practical applicability through examples such as the Circular Economy Trusteeship Platform (CETP). Ultimately, it argues that institutions are sustained not by "correctness" but by "legitimacy," and institutional trusteeship offers a new public architecture for embedding that legitimacy into institutional design.

Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2025-04
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tky:jseres:2025cj313

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