Competition Among Sellers who offer Auctions Instead of Prices

Michael Peters () and Sergei Severinov

Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper we study a large market in which sellers compete by offering auctions to buyers instead of simple fixed price contracts. Two variants of the model are studied. One extends a model first analyzed by Wolinsky (1988) in which buyers learn their valuations only after meeting sellers. The other variant extends the model of McAfee (1993) in which buyers know their valuations before they choose among available auctions. The equilibrium array of auctions is characterized for each case and the efficiency properties of the equilibria are analyzed.

JEL-codes: D4 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 1995-06-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Competition among Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tor:tecipa:peters-95-02

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