A Competitive Distribution of Auctions

Michael Peters ()

Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper a competitive distribution of auctions is described for an economy consisting of an infinite number of buyers and sellers, all of whom differ according to their valuation for the single indivisible object being traded. A competitive distribution of auctions is such that no seller can improve his profits by deviating to any alternative direct mechanism. It is shown that the competitive distribution of auctions will have the property that each buyer and seller's best reply is independent of his beliefs about the tastes of other buyers and sellers on the market.

JEL-codes: D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 1995-08-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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