Competition Among Mechanism Designers in a Common Value Environment

Michael Peters ()

Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics

Abstract: A competitive economy is studied in which sellers offer alternative direct mechanisms to buyers who have private information about their own private use value for the commodity being traded. In addition the commodity has a common value to all buyers, perhaps represented by the future resale value of the commodity. A competitive equilibrium in mechanisms is described. In every such equilibrium it is shown that sellers must offer mechanisms that are allocationally equivalent to English ascending price auctions. The reservation prices that sellers set are equal to the ex post value of a 'marginal' unsold unit. This value is below the ex post opportunity cost to the seller of trading the commodity.

JEL-codes: D44 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 1996-04-15
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/public/workingPapers/UT-ECIPA-PETERS-96-01.ps MainText (application/postscript)

Related works:
Journal Article: Competition among mechanism designers in a common value environment (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tor:tecipa:peters-96-01

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics 150 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by RePEc Maintainer ().