Limits of Exact Equilibria for Capacity Constrained Sellers with costlySearch

Michael Peters ()

Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics

Abstract: The paper contrasts the exact equilibria of games where sellers compete in price with the rational expectations equilibria of these games. It is shown that the distribution of prices offered by sellers in both the exact and rational expectations equilibrium converge weakly to the same limit as the number of buyers and sellers grows large. Furthermore, the payoffs that sellers face in both kinds of equilibrium have the market utility property in the limit.

JEL-codes: D44 D45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 1998-07-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/public/workingPapers/UT-ECIPA-PETERS-98-01.ps MainText (application/postscript)
https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/public/workingPapers/UT-ECIPA-PETERS-98-01.pdf MainText (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Limits of Exact Equilibria for Capacity Constrained Sellers with Costly Search (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tor:tecipa:peters-98-01

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics 150 St. George Street, Toronto, Ontario.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by RePEc Maintainer ().