The Usefulness of Corruptible Elections

Loren Brandt () and Matthew Turner

Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics

Abstract: Using a sample of rural Chines villages which have recently been the subject of democratic reforms we look for the relationship between marginal changes in the democratic process and marginal changes in economic outcomes. We find that even very poorly conducted elections can have large incentive effects. That is, even corruptible elections provide leaders with strong incentives to act in the interests of their constituents. Our findings also allow us to rank the imiprotance of four possible election reforms which have attracted the attention of international observers and academic researchers.

Keywords: Elections; Corruption; China (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 H0 H7 Q0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2006-05-26
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Usefulness of Corruptible Elections (2003)
Working Paper: The Usefulness of Corruptible Elections (2003)
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