Sequential entry into electoral competition when the possibility of ties is limited

Osborne, Martin

Sequential entry into electoral competition when the possibility of ties is limited

Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics

Abstract: The members of a finite set of office-motivated politicians choose sequentially whether to become candidates in an electoral competition. Each candidate chooses a position from a set X that is a (possibly strict) subset of the set of all positions. I show that if X is a subset of a one-dimensional interval, a tie is possible only among candidates who choose the same position, and a candidate wins if her vote share exceeds 1/2 and only if it is at least as large as any other candidate's vote share, then in every subgame perfect equilibrium the first and last politicians to move enter at one of the members of X closest to the median of the citizens' favorite positions and the remaining politicians do not enter. The assumption about ties is satisfied if the winner of the election is chosen from among the candidates with the highest vote shares by a mediator with strict preferences over positions or if the set X does not admit ties at distinct positions.

Keywords: Electoral competition; sequential entry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: P0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: Unknown pages
Date: 2024-09-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pol
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