Port Terminal Concessions: Towards a Dynamic Concession Fee

Claudio Ferrari, Pier Paolo Puliafito and Alessio Tei

Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 2018, vol. 52, issue 2, 137--156

Abstract: Ports are key nodes of the transport networks and their efficiency is strategic for regional competitiveness. Port operations are performed by a heterogeneous group of market players — in the landlord system, stevedore activities are performed in public port spaces that have been used exclusively by operators for several decades. Within this framework, several authors have discussed how differentiated rules within the concession agreements might contribute to increasing terminal performance. Despite this, few authors discuss the introduction of performance clauses in the concession agreements. Current research introduces a dynamic concession fee evaluation method and applies it to a case study.

Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tpe:jtecpo:2018:52:2:137--156

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