Moral Hazard in Traffic Games

Pål Andreas Pedersen

Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 2003, vol. 37, issue 1, 47-68

Abstract: A two-person game-theoretical model is suggested in order to explain traffic safety behaviour among road users. A road user's outcome is dependent on her and her opponent's attitude towards aggression, her and her opponent's level of attention, as well as on external traffic safety conditions. The existence and size of moral hazard effects for different outcomes of the game are discussed, and an evolutionary equilibrium, endogenously defining the share of aggressive road users, is deduced, and shown most likely to increase as external safety improvements take place. © The London School of Economics and the University of Bath 2003

Date: 2003
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.catchword.com/cgi-bin/cgi?ini=bc&body=l ... 20030101)37:1L.47;1- (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tpe:jtecpo:v:37:y:2003:i:1:p:47-68

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Transport Economics and Policy is currently edited by B T Bayliss, S A Morrison, A Smith and D Graham

More articles in Journal of Transport Economics and Policy from University of Bath
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().