Evaluating Alternative Policy Responses to Franchise Failure: Evidence from the Passenger Rail Sector in Britain

Andrew S. J. Smith and Phil Wheat

Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 2012, vol. 46, issue 1, 25-49

Abstract: One potential problem with franchising (competitive tendering) is how to deal with situations where the franchisee is unwilling to continue operating the franchise within the contract period. This paper studies the effects of the franchising authority's response to franchise failure in passenger rail in Britain, which saw the affected operators placed onto management or short-term renegotiated contracts for an extended period. We find that operators on management contracts saw a sharp deterioration in efficiency. Further, the contract inefficiency persisted, though was eliminated by competitive refranchising. In contrast, costs for renegotiated franchises were no higher (statistically) than industry best practice. © 2012 LSE and the University of Bath

Date: 2012
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.catchword.com/cgi-bin/cgi?ini=bc&body=l ... 20120101)46:1L.25;1- (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tpe:jtecpo:v:46:y:2012:i:1:p:25-49

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Transport Economics and Policy is currently edited by B T Bayliss, S A Morrison, A Smith and D Graham

More articles in Journal of Transport Economics and Policy from University of Bath
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().