Fight or Flight: Endogenous Timing in Conflicts

Boris van Leeuwen, Theo Offerman and Jeroen van de Ven
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Boris van Leeuwen: Department of Economics, Tilburg University
Theo Offerman: CREED, University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute
Jeroen van de Ven: ASE, University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute

The Review of Economics and Statistics, 2022, vol. 104, issue 2, 217-231

Abstract: We study a dynamic game in which players compete for a prize. In a waiting game with two-sided private information about strength levels, players choose fighting, fleeing, or waiting. Players earn a "deterrence value" on top of the prize if their opponent escapes without a battle. We show that this value is a key determinant of the type of equilibrium. For intermediate values, sorting takes place, with weaker players fleeing before others fight. Time then helps to reduce battles. In an experiment, we find support for the key theoretical predictions and document suboptimal predatory fighting.

Date: 2022
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