Measuring the deterrence properties of competition policy: the Competition Policy Indexes

Paolo Buccirossi, Lorenzo Ciari, Tomaso Duso, Giancarlo Spagnolo and Cristiana Vitale

Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems from Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to describe in detail a set of newly developed indicators of the quality of competition policy, Competition Policy Indexes, or CPIs. The CPIs measure the deterrence properties of a competition policy in a jurisdiction, where for competition policy we mean the antitrust legislation, including the merger control provisions, and its enforcement. The CPIs incorporate data on how the key features of a competition policy regime score against a benchmark of generally-agreed best practices and summarise them so as to allow cross-country and cross-time comparisons. The CPIs have been calculated for a sample of 13 OECD jurisdictions over the period 1995-2005.

Keywords: Competition Policy; Indicator; Deterrence; Competition Law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 K42 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: MEASURING THE DETERRENCE PROPERTIES OF COMPETITION POLICY: THE COMPETITION POLICY INDEXES (2011)
Working Paper: Measuring the deterrence properties of competition policy: The competition policy indexes (2009)
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