International Sanctions and Coups d’État

Pascal Langer

No 2024-14, Research Papers in Economics from University of Trier, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper analyzes how international sanctions influence the likelihood of coups d’état in targeted countries. Using panel logit models, an event-study design, and propensity-score weighting on data for 158 countries from 1971 to 2019, I find that Western sanctions significantly increase coup risk, with an initial effect of about 7.8 pp in the first year after imposition. On average, Western sanctions raise the probability of coups by 1.7–1.9 pp, and successful coups by 2.1–2.3 pp, with particularly strong effects in the post-Cold War era. The impact is largely driven by authoritarian regimes, especially personalist and military systems.

Keywords: Sanctions; Coups d’État; Democracy; Autocracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 F51 H56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 54 pages
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his and nep-int
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trr:wpaper:202414

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