The Condorcet Principle Implies the Proxy Voting Paradox

Michel Le Breton

No 16-80, IAST Working Papers from Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST)

Abstract: In this note, we formulate a condition describing the vulnerability of a social choice function to a specific kind of strategic behavior and show that two well known classes of choice functions suffer from it.

Keywords: Condorcet; Departing Voter Paradox; Backward Induction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-02
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