A folk theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring

Johannes Hörner and Jérôme Renault

No 23-1473, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: We adapt the methods from Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990) to finitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring. Under a combination of (a slight strengthening of) the assumptions of Benoıˆt and Krishna (1985) and those of Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994), a folk theorem follows. Three counterexamples show that our assumptions are tight.

Keywords: Repeated; games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ger, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:128536

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