Highway to Sell

Philippe Bontems, Marie-Françoise Calmette and David Martimort

No 25-1652, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: Motivated by the forthcoming terminations of most highways concessions in France, we propose a versatile model of dynamic regulation and contract renewals that describes a long-term relationship between the public authority and an incumbent operator with private information about its costs that may face potential entrants. We discuss various issues including the nature of discriminatory biases towards entrants, their consequences on investments, the public or private nature of the management of concessions, the role of the operator's financial constraints, the consequences of allotments. So doing, we isolate a few principles that should guide policy-makers when deciding upon concession renewals.

Keywords: Procurement; concession contracts; contract renewal; highways; transportation; auctions; asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 L51 L91 L98 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-07-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur, nep-mic and nep-tre
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/docu ... 2025/wp_tse_1652.pdf Full Text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:130653

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().