Price Discrimination and Online Sales in the Automobile Industry

Isis Durrmeyer, Xavier D'Haultfoeuille, Jean-François Fournel and Alessandro Iaria

No 25-1654, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: We investigate the welfare consequences of introducing an online distribution channel in the French car industry, where most sales take place in person through car dealers relying on third-degree price discrimination. We estimate a structural model of demand with unobserved third-degree price discrimination and transportation costs related to visiting car dealers. In counterfactuals, we introduce an online distribution channel in which prices are uniform and consumers benefit from lower transportation costs. When both distribution channels are available, firms charge low online prices to attract internet-savvy consumers online, while continuing to price discriminate the less internet-savvy consumers in person. The online channel is profitable for firms, and the more it reduces transportation costs, the more profitable it is. However, the costs and benefits of the online channel are unevenly distributed among consumers, with older, wealthier, and internet-savvy consumers obtaining most of the benefits.

Date: 2025-07-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-eur, nep-ind and nep-tre
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