Verified Reassurance and Conflict Cycles

Andrei Gyarmathy and Georgy Lukyanov

No 26-1712, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: Peaceful conduct can appear hostile, yet verbal reassurance is least credible when mistrust is greatest. We study a limited-memory conflict model in which an actor whose dovish action is perceived as hostile can pay for truthful, nonforgeable clarification. Because evidence changes a normal opponent’s response but not a committed-hostile opponent’s, verification incentives fall with mistrust—a reassurance drought that sustains conflict cycles between normal groups. Better verification weakly reduces conflict onset and prevalence, but may lengthen the entire duration distribution: once innocent mistakes are more often resolved, an adverse record that remains is more diagnostic of hostility. This distinction changes mediation design. Support during peace can lengthen conflict and reduce conditional normal–normal welfare within the interior stationary regime. Support activated during unresolved conflict lowers prevalence, shortens every duration quantile, and raises welfare when its conflict-reduction benefit exceeds induced resource costs. Effective reassurance policy should therefore target recovery.

JEL-codes: C72 C73 D74 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-02, Revised 2026-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-gth and nep-mic
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