Reputational Conservatism in Expert Advice

Georgy Lukyanov and Anna Vlasova

No 26-1715, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: We develop a tractable career–concerns model of expert recommendations with a continuous private signal. In equilibrium, advice obeys a cutoff rule: the expert recommends the risky option if and only if the signal exceeds a threshold. Under a mild relative–diagnosticity condition, the threshold is (weakly) increasing in reputation, yielding reputational conservatism. Signal informativeness and success priors lower the cutoff, while stronger career concerns raise it. A success–contingent bonus implements any target experimentation rate via a one–to–one mapping, providing an implementable design lever.

JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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