Tarification d’accès et qualité du réseau dans le transport ferroviaire

Philippe Bontems, Marie-Françoise Calmette and David Martimort

No 26-1753, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: This paper studies access pricing in a vertically separated railway sector where the in-frastructure manager sets access charges and chooses network quality, while downstream operators choose transport services. The model characterizes the inefficiencies of unregula-ted vertical separation and then derives optimal regulation with and without public transfers. When transfers are constrained, access charges follow a Ramsey logic modified by downs-tream market power and by cross-effects among long-distance operators. Under asymmetric information, the relevant access cost is no longer the physical marginal cost but a virtual cost that incorporates the information rents of the infrastructure manager and the traffic consequences of incentive constraints.

Keywords: Access pricing; railroad regulation; vertical separation; infrastructure quality; asymmetric information; mechanism design; information rents (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 H21 L43 L51 L92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-06
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/docu ... 2026/wp_tse_1753.pdf Full Text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:131798

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().