Policing Police Violence: Sheriff-Coroners and the Underreporting of Police Killings

Rubén Poblete-Cazenave ()
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Rubén Poblete-Cazenave: Department d'Economia Aplicada, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain and Tinbergen Institute, Netherlands.

Working Papers from Department of Applied Economics at Universitat Autonoma of Barcelona

Abstract: In the United States, law enforcement kills three people per day, yet official statistics record only half. Using detailed geo‑location of police killings and exploiting spatial and temporal discontinuities in medicolegal death‑investigation systems across counties from 2000–2024, I show that sheriff‑coroner jurisdictions are 15–19 percentage points (approx. 30 percent) less likely to report killings to the FBI. The effect concentrates among Black victims and increases after high‑profile killings (Michael Brown, George Floyd), suggesting public scrutiny intensifies suppression rather than deterring it. The findings highlight how institutional dependence can systematically distort official record and hinder accountability.

Keywords: Police Killings; Underreporting; Medico-legal death investigatio noffice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2026-05
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