An Ascending Double Auction

Michael Peters () and Sergei Severinov

Microeconomics.ca working papers from Vancouver School of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies an internet trading mechanism similar to the one described in Peters and Severinov (2000) in a market where traders values are interdependent. Conditions are given for which this mechanism has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium which supports allocations that are the same as the allocations supported by a rational expectations equilibrium. In particular, this equilibrium supports allocations that are ex post efficient. We show how to construct the rational expectations equilibrium belief function from posterior beliefs at terminal information sets of the internet trading game. The mechanism is also compared to a double auction.

Keywords: double auctions; rational expectations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2003-12-16, Revised 2005-02-26
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Forthcoming in Economic Theory

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Journal Article: An ascending double auction (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ubc:pmicro:peters-03-12-16-01-57-39

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